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I. Two MODELS OF JUDGING

Judges are expected to satisfy two conflicting ideals. First, they are to
follow the law without fear or favor, regardless of personal sympathies
and preferences, to "adjudicate" rather than to "legislate." Second, they
are to reach results that are preferred by or at least acceptable to their
communities. The first ideal requires judicial independence and job security. Elective judgeships are sometimes defended as serving the second.
It is not easy to convince people that the two ideals conflict. Judges are
expected to assert that what their communities want the law to be really
is the law, whether or not there is a legal basis for the assertion. If a
judge finds this difficult to do, there generally is someone else ready to
do it.
It is not news that the system of electing judges calls into question
what it means to be a judge. But how does our model of an elected judge
differ from our model of an appointed judge? The topic has become timely
due to three recent court decisions and another stormy battle over a
judicial appointment.
We have gone through a third public examination of a Supreme Court
nominee in which the Senate and the public considered it important to
question the nominee about his views of the major issues on the Court's
contemporary agenda. Judge Robert Bork explained his views in his academic writings, in his prior legal work, and in the hearings, and he was
rejected. Judge David Souter and Judge Clarence Thomas, on the other
hand, avoided clear statements and were confirmed. At the close of the
Thomas hearing, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee expressed
frustration at their inability to get answers, and the chairman announced
that the committee would reexamine the entire confirmation process.
Academic commentators approved the new practice of probing a nominee's
views rather more enthusiastically than the same practice used by the
President in making appointments. Senators will likely extend the scrutiny to lower court appointees who look like embryonic Supreme Court
nominees.
* The Fifty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture, delivered at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland, Ohio on November 21, 1991.
** Judge, Oregon Supreme Court, 1977-90; Senior Judge since 1990.
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Recent events in the law of judicial elections are less widely noted.
Public examination like the Bork, Souter, and Thomas hearings do not
occur in the states. The reason is not that state court decisions are unimportant or uncontroversial. Vastly more cases on a far wider range of
issues are decided by state judges than by the relatively few federal
judges. But very few states follow the model of executive appointment
and legislative confirmation. In 16 states, judges appointed by the governor face elections in which the question is whether or not to retain the
judge on the court.' In 19 other states, judges are elected in competitive
elections and often face competition for another term. 2 Some states elect
In 1990 alone,
trial judges by one system and appellate judges by another.
3
more than 2,400 judges appeared on the state ballots.
Elections imply constituencies, candidates, campaigns, organized support, opposition, and campaign funds. In the case of legislators and political
executives, elections imply general and specific campaign promises. We
pause when these essential features of democratic choice are applied to
judges. This discomfort leads to efforts to distinguish the position of elective judges from that of other elective policy-makers, efforts that in turn
raise constitutional doubts. The American Bar Association and some
states have reexamined their codes governing judicial campaigns. Before
turning to the recent cases, however, we need to introduce another element. We need to consider our prevailing theories of what judges do and
how they should do it.
American law leaves more than most legal systems to the social views
and the ad hoc discretion of judges. Our jurisprudential theorists as well
as first-year law students study rules of law only as products of choices
made by appellate courts. In part, our reliance on courts in preference to
laws reflects the homelessness of systematic lawmaking in our structures
of government. The reliance on court-made law is familiar in what remains of the common law, especially in torts, but also in such central
public policies as the law governing law enforcement. A trial judge's
personal judgment appears indispensable in family and criminal cases
even after the swing to determinate sentencing laws. And the power of
American state as well as federal judges is, of course, famous in the
constitutional review of legislation.
In our court-centered legal order it was no great feat to describe law
as whatever judges decide. This has been the orthodoxy of American law
for a century. Legal realism soon went beyond a theory describing judicial
behavior to a demand for an explicitly social and instrumental, that is
to say, a policy-making style in appellate decisions. The road to judicial
distinction was to announce that the reason why the Constitution forbids
racial segregation in schools is its effect on education, or that the court's

'PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 5, n.7 (1990).
2Id.

3 See
(1990).

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES
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view of contemporary realities calls for abolishing an old tort immunity,
for dispensing with proof of causation for liability for an untraceable
product, or for replacing contributory with comparative negligence. And
where the court cannot fashion a new rule, it announces a new multifactor balancing formula to be used in making future judicial decisions.
In constitutional law, scholars like Lawrence Tribe link what some call
the "antimajoritarian difficulty" 4 ofjudicial review to the fact that federal
judges are not elected or otherwise accountable to elected officials. John
Hart Ely's stated objection to having judges enforce their view of national
values is not that they are judges, but that they are unelected judges.5
Burt Neuborne warns against a "myth of parity" between state and federal courts in unpopular cases but argues that elected judges have a
greater "democratic pedigree" when they do act.6 From the other end of
the political spectrum, Robert Bork declares that only unelected, unaccountable and unrepresentative judges can prevent voters from destroy7
ing the republic and basic freedoms.
What does all the talk about unelected judges imply when judges are
elected? Should elected judges decide controversial issues of equality,
privacy, speech, religion, or police practices less judicially, more according
to public opinion, than their appointed colleagues in the neighboring
state? The constitutional scholars, to whom state courts seem to be invisible, do not say so. Nor does Justice Robert Utter of Washington, when
he describes the tension between the ideal of an independent judiciary,
demanding strict adherence to the law no matter how unpopular the
result, and the ideal of every public servant's democratic accountability.
But if appointed and elected judges should approach the task of judging
in the same judicial manner, what is the point of electing judges?
"Judicial accountability" has a virtuous ring to it, until one asks, "accountability" for what? For judging fairly and impartially, for conscientious attention to law and facts, for staying awake, sober and courteous
to the parties, witnesses, and court personnel-in short, for performing
according to the classic model of judging? Or does it mean accountability
for decisions in controversial cases?
In the classic model, the judicial power is something other than the
legislative or the executive power. The responsibility ofjudges is not that
of legislators or law enforcement officials. A judge's responsibility is to
decide disputes impartially according to law, not according to prior commitments, political inducements, or the popular demands of the moment.

H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 62-63 (2d ed. 1988).
John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in
a World Where Courts Are No Different From Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833,
864-65 (1991).
6
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977).
7
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
LAURENCE

THE LAW

8

5 (1990).

Robert F. Utter, State ConstitutionalLaw, The United States Supreme Court,
and DemocraticAccountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH.
L. REV. 19 (1989).
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On the other hand, the realists tell us that the classic model is a pious
fiction; that judges inevitably make law, wholesale in the appellate courts
and retail in trial courts; that judges do so upon considerations which are
not very different from those of other policymakers; and that what people
get will depend on the beliefs, values, and loyalties that the judges bring
to the bench. If so, it is argued, people are entitled to judges chosen for
their beliefs, values, and commitments, and to replace them on the same
basis-to be "represented" on the courts. So we get what Michael Shapiro
calls the "clumsy institution"9 that tries to straddle the contradiction of
independence and democratic control.
II. JUDGES AS REPRESENTATIVES

In what sense are elected officials the "representatives" of those who
are entitled to elect them? Since 1802, Ohio's Constitution has guaranteed
its people the right to assemble to consult for the common good and to
instruct their representatives. ° When the people of a state insist on electing their judges, do they expect judges to act as their representatives in
the same manner as legislators? Are all judges policymaking officials?
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's oneperson, one-vote principle does not apply to judicial elections. 1 But the
Voting Rights Act forbids any political process that gives some citizens,
by reason of race or color, less opportunity than others to participate and
to "elect representatives of their choice."'12 The Voting Rights Act includes
districting that dilutes minority votes. Did "representatives" include two
Louisiana justices elected from one double district and trial judges elected
county-wide in Texas? The Fifth Circuit thought not. It described judges
as "the referees in our majoritarian political game" 13 who "represent no
one."14

The Supreme Court reversed because excluding judges from the word
"representatives" would exclude other practices besides judicial districting from the act. 15 The Court read "representatives" to mean anyone
elected in a popular election. Three dissenting justices argued that
"'[r]epresentative' connotes one who is not only elected by the people, but
who also ...acts on behalfof the people."16 Unlike prosecutors who appear

9 Michael

H. Shapiro, Introduction:JudicialSelection and the Design of Clumsy

Institutions, 61

S. CAL. L.
'0 OHIO CONST.of 1802,

REV. 1555 (1988).
art. VIII, § 19 superseded by OHIO CONST. art. I, § 53

(1851).
11Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973), affg 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La.

1972).

1242

U.S.C. § 1971(n)(1) (1981) (amended 1982).
13Latin American Citizens Council #4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 631 (5th
Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyer's Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111
S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
14 Id. at 625.
11Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S.Ct. 2354 (1991).
16Id. at 2372.
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for "the People," they wrote, "the judge represents the Law-which often
requires him to rule against the People. '1?
The Court clearly stated its distaste for electing judges. The majority
editorialized that judges need not be elected, and that "ideally public
opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the judge is often
called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment." 8 But Louisiana chose to "compel judicial candidates to vie for popular support just
as other political candidates do."'19 The Court continued: "The fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real
world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges with
total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them
to run for elected office. '20 Election pressures, the court noted, carry the
burdens of "financing a campaign, soliciting
votes, and attempting to
2
establish charisma or name identification." '
Yet on the same day, the Court referred to the policy-making nature
of the judicial function, with the customary reference to Holmes and
22
Cardozo, in sustaining Missouri's age limit on its judges. Justice 0'-

Connor, a former state judge, observed that periodic elections might not
suffice to force judges to retire: Voters could expect to discover that their
governor or legislator was not performing adequately, she wrote, but
"most voters never observe state judges in action, nor read judicial opin2
ions." 3

Representation can mean something different from making policy
choices on behalf of one's constituency. One can argue that the right to
choose judges for their human and social values matters more in choosing
trial judges than appellate judges, contrary to the academic preoccupation
with policy decisions by the highest courts. Consider this report from
California after a lesbian civil rights lawyer in 1990 defeated a Superior
Court judge for the first time in 18 years:
[Hitchens] said she did not challenge Benson because of anything the judge did on the bench. But she did want to bring to
the court a perspective different from that of the career prosecutor, a Deukmejian appointee who was a member of the exclusive Olympic Club ....

Hitchens attributes her narrow

election victory to support from a broad coalition of minority
groups, labor leaders, and attorneys.
'It seemed time that the lesbian and gay community be represented on Superior Court, in terms of the experience one

Id.

17

18

Id.

at 2367.

19

d.

S. Ct. at 2367.
Id. at 2367 n.29 (quoting John Paul Stevens, The Office of an Office, 55

20 111
21

CHI.

B. REc. 276, 280-81 (1974)).
22 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
23
Id. at 2407.
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brings from their life, recognizing some value in diversity,'
Hitchens said ....

'I think that affects the way you respond to

both verbal and nonverbal behavior in the courtroom, [as well
as] ... make you more receptive to alternative dispute resolution, alternative sentencing, joint endeavors with the community to get meaningful and effective programs off the
ground.'

24

III. PARTIES IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

Who may tell voters that a judicial candidate is "one of us" and an
opponent is "one of them"? 25 At one time, judges like other officials were

elected on a partisan ballot. The partisan ballot is still used for electing
judges in thirteen states, including large states like Illinois, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Texas. 26 (The others are Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana,
Kansas, Mississippi, Missoui, North Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia.) 27 In Ohio, I understand, judicial candidates are nominated in party
primaries so that their party affiliation is a known element in the election
even though party affiliation does not appear on the final election ballot. 28
North Carolina had a partisan election in 1990. A reformist North
Carolina Committee on Judicial Campaigns with apparent trepidation
set out some standards to guide judicial candidates. Observing that North
Carolina had not in modern times had a "two-party judiciary,"29 the committee asserted its nonpartisanship and its effort not to appear to shelter
incumbent judges against challengers. Its guidelines called for letting
representatives or committees handle campaign financing and limiting
contributions from any attorney or other source so as to avoid the appearance that the contributor sought special advantage from the candidate. The guidelines stuck with the usual prescription that candidates
speak about their qualifications and views on court reform, adding rather
gingerly "identification of [a] general philosophical orientation, but the
candidate should avoid intimating or forecasting how he or she would
rule on a particular issue or fact situation.

'3

The committee also offered

candidates a complaint procedure that theoretically could lead to appropriate action by the committee, presumably in the form of adverse publicity, but the procedure was limited to complaints against the candidates
or those working on their campaigns.
- George Markell, New Judge, New Perspective: Donna Hitchens Says She
Brings a Respect for Diversity, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 1991, at A4.
5 Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991). See infra notes 44-48 and accom-

panying text. Partisanship was at issue in this case but was not decided.
26 McFADDEN, supra note 1, at 178-87.

27 Id.
"IId. at 185. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3501.01(j), 3505.03, 3505.04 (Baldwin
1992).

NORTH CAROLINA COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS, JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN

1
GUIDELINES
30

Id. at 3.

(Sept. 7, 1990).
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Two weeks later, North Carolina newspapers reported that the state's
Republican governor had delivered a "biting attack" on its Democratic
supreme court justices for being too liberal. The governor called for replacing the three justices who were candidates for reelection with Republican superior court judges in order to create a conservative majority.31
Some quotations give a flavor of the campaign. A teacher had been
awarded damages under federal civil rights law for being fired in a biased
32
dismissal proceeding, and the supreme court affirmed.
"You're going to love this," [the governor said]. "There was a
driver education instructor over in Hickory who had a bad thing
about taking indecent liberties with teenage girls."
"The liberal Democratic majority of the [North Carolina Supreme Court] said, 'That's all right, he can have $78,000' ....
the
Maybe it was the little girl who should have gotten
3
$78,000," he said, drawing cheers from the audience.
The Governor also asserted that the Democratic justices' campaigns
were financed by lawyers for tort plaintiffs who "appear before them and
rake in huge contingency fees," citing another decision that sustained a
malpractice claim of parents for emotional distress from the stillborn birth
of a fetus.3 4 In a separate television commercial, the Republican state
chairman attacked the court for overturning a murder conviction in terms
that are drearily familiar to every elected judge: "[T]he judges on our
Supreme Court are more interested in criminal rights than in victim
3 5
rights."
The chiefjustice, one of the Democratic candidates, observed that these
opinions were not written by any candidate but by a justice whom the
governor had praised as the most conservative member of the court.3 6 But
this fact provides only partial cover in campaigns for election to a collegial
court. Voters are invited to feel angry at a decision and to vent that anger
against any judge who participated in it.

11Rob Christensen, Martin Goes to Bat for JudicialCandidates,RALEIGH NEWSSept. 24, 1990, at lB.
12 Crump v. Board of Educ. of Hickory Admin. Sch. Unit, 392 S.E.2d 579 (N.C.
1990),
Christiansen, supra note 31, at 3B.
Id. at 1B, 3B. Judicial campaign contributions by trial lawyers have been a
contentious issue elsewhere. In a 1988 report, a Texas group stated that half of
a total $8.8 million had gone to four Texas Supreme Court justices, and that
"[s]upport and contributions from plaintiffs attorneys 'dwarf all others'." Peggy
Rikac, Group Ponders Effect of Law Firms' Largess to State Court: Jurists Report
Stirs Criticism from Several Quarters,HOUSTON POST, Sept. 27, 1988, at All.
In 1990, the Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association proposed legislation to fund
judicial campaigns in anticipation of more partisan contests in that state. Sue
Allison, Bill Enacts Tax to Pay for Supreme Court Campaigns,UPI, Jan. 22, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
15GOP Chiefs Attack Discomfits Hopefuls, RALEIGH NEWS-OBSERVER, Sept. 16,
1990, at 1C, 3C.
36 Christensen, supra note 31, at 3B.
OBSERVER,
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The Republican candidates distanced themselves from the criticisms
made by their party spokesmen. The governor himself knew better; four
years earlier, one editorial recalled, he had told North Carolina lawyers
that the system of partisan elections was "outmoded and wrong and...
against the best interests of our people. 3 7 That occurred when the gov-

ernor's Republican appointee as chiefjustice was defeated by a Democrat.
Whatever his real views were, in a partisan election the party's political
leaders are expected to argue for the party's candidates. The efforts of
the North Carolina Committee on Judicial Campaigns expressly focused
on the conduct of the judges' own campaigns, leaving party leaders, officials, and other groups to use the judicial election in whatever way
served their respective goals.
It is difficult for a watchdog committee to regulate what party leaders,
officials, and others say about judges, beyond protesting falsehoods and
exaggerations. Exploitation of high profile judges for partisan ends is not
limited to partisan judicial elections or to elective judgeships. In 1986,
California's Governor Deukmejian sometimes appeared to be running
against Chief Justice Bird, who was defeated in a retention election, just
as President Nixon earlier had campaigned for law and order against the
Warren Court. In 1990, the Republican candidate for governor of New
York campaigned against the "Cuomo Court" for coddling criminals. 8
Some people might suspect political motivation in the most recent Supreme Court appointment if the President had not assured us that he
chose Judge Thomas as the most qualified person for that Court.
Nonetheless, it has been considered a major reform that most states
abandoned partisan for nonpartisan judicial elections. But what exactly
does this change? May a partisan governor then not attack a judge's views
and decisions and support the opposing candidate? Can a party chairman
be kept from doing the same in television commercials? 3The
question
9
reached the Supreme Court this year but was not decided.
The distinction between partisan and nonpartisan elections is a consequence of printing official ballots, a system that the states adopted only
after the Civil War. Previously, voters might cast a vote for anyone they
chose, or put in the ballot box the "straight tickets" prepared for them
by the respective political parties. Legally, the parties were private as-

17 Martin's Ugly Attack, RALEIGH NEWS-OBSERVER, Sept. 26, 1990, at 18A. In
1988, North Carolina's Chief Justice James G. Exum, Jr. reviewed Governor
Martin's previous efforts to recruit Republican opponents for the state's largely
Democratic judiciary and the disruptive effects of lengthy and expensive election
campaigns on the work of the courts. His recommendations to the state's Judicial
Selection Study Committee concluded that most desirable system of judicial selection would be gubernatorial appointment with legislative confirmation for
terms of 15 or more years, without reappointment. James Exum, Judicial Selection in North Carolina,N.C. B. Q., Summer 1988, at 4.
8Rinfret Says He'd Ask Top Court Judges to Quit, TIMES UNION, Oct. 5, 1990,
at Bll.
"9 Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991).
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sociations without special powers. A printed official ballot, however, must
select which candidates have enough support to be placed on the ballot.
This meant primarily candidates nominated by major political parties,
nowadays by state-run party primaries. But when partisanship seemed
inconsistent with some offices such as judicial office, state ballots dropped
party identification for those candidates.
This should leave parties in their original role as unofficial electoral
associations. Canon 7 of the ABA's widely used Code of Judicial Conduct
did not deny parties the right to support judicial candidates. 40 But it
forbade judicial candidates from identifying themselves as members of a
party and claiming its support, even when the membership and the support are matters of public record. 41 A 1988 decision censured a Washington
judge in part for a letter discussing his and his opponent's 42party record,
despite the judge's objections under the First Amendment.
California went further by prohibiting party officials from endorsing
any candidates in the party primary and candidates from claiming such
an endorsement. In 1989, the Supreme Court held that such restrictions
burdened freedom of political association and advocacy contrary to the
First Amendment. 43 In another case, Geary v. Renne,44 the Ninth Circuit
en banc invalidated another provision that prohibited parties from endorsing, supporting, or opposing judges and other nonpartisan candidates.
In a concurring opinion, Judges Reinhardt and Kozinsky responded to
an argument that party endorsements were a threat to judicial independence. They questioned whether judges who must face election can
be independent from those on whom they rely to remain on the bench.
Noting that "U]udicial candidates are rated by various interest groups
and are questioned about their decisions,' ' 45 they stated:

The paradox.., lies in the assumption that judges can remain
independent though compelled to seek financial contributions
and other assistance, including endorsements, from powerful
special interests and pressure groups, but that their very integrity may crumble if they ask members of a political party
4
publicly to proclaim their collective support.
Judges Reinhardt and Kozinsky continued:
[Plolitical parties have as much right to make known their
views regarding candidates for judicial office as do the Crime
Victims for Court Reform, the Law and Order Campaign Com-

- See

McFADDEN,

supra note 1, at 101-02.

In 1990, a new ABA draft proposed to allow judicial candidates to identify
themselves as members of a party. Id. at 195.
42In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988).
41Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
911 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 750 (1991),
and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991).
41

41

Id. at 290.

- Id.
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mittee, the District Attorneys' Association of California, the
National Organization for Women, or the San FranciscoChronicle, all of which 4took
official positions in California's 1986
7
retention election .
The concurring judges noted that instead of party tickets distributed
by political parties before the state printed official ballots, California now
has "slate mailers," printed and mailed by private entrepreneurs in a
pseudo-official format, on which judges and other nonpartisan candidates
pay to be included among so-called "endorsed" candidates. They concluded: "California cannot have it both ways. If it wants to elect its judges,
it cannot deprive its citizens of a full and robust election debate. It cannot
forbid speech by persons or groups who wish to make their views, support,
or endorsements known."4 If people are to choose their judges, they must

be free to form their judgment on the basis of endorsements and the
candidates' political philosophies, just as much as Presidents do when
they appoint federal judges from members of their own parties.
So in the West at least, the First Amendment lets political parties, like
other groups, endorse nonpartisan judicial candidates and lets candidates
ask for support.
But does the First Amendment protect a candidate's right to ask for
financial support to get the message to the voters? The canon says no.
The issue led to our third case of the year, a disciplinary proceeding
against a supreme court judge.
IV.

SEEKING CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

A recent study of financing the 1988 Texas campaign for chief justice
begins:
Conflicts between plaintiff and defense attorneys normally take
place in court proceedings. But in Texas ...

[and elsewhere]

attorneys on opposite sides of the docket have the opportunity
to fight their battles in another arena as well, namely in attempting to influence the outcome of judicial elections through'
campaign contributions.

49

Naturally, one would expect interest groups, regular litigants and lawyers to contribute to those judicial candidates
whom they view as being generally favorable to their own
interests. Such is the nature of normal partisan politics. But
normal politics may contribute to ethical dilemmas for judges
who, after election, are supposed to be fair, impartial and ob41

Id. at 292.

" Id. at 294.
4 Donald W. Jackson & James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Money and Politics in
JudicialElections: The 1988 Election of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme
Court, 74 JUDICATURE 184 (1991).
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jective toward all who appear before them. Everyone expects
legislators to look after the interests of supporters and con50
tributors, but that is not the normal expectation for judges.
The study found that 85 percent of respondents believed that a state's
type of judicial selection affects the neutrality of judges, and that most
people did not believe that political contributions do not affect a judge's
decisions.

51

Justice Joseph Grodin of California, whose loss of a retention election
was a by-product of the heavily financed campaign against Chief Justice
Rose Bird in 1986, called asking for campaign funds "one of the worst
experiences of my life," particularly when he found that one of his fundraisers had told lawyers that Grodin
would remember after the election
52
who contributed and who did not.

Another view of the process is less agonized than cheerfully agnostic.
Justice Richard Neely of West Virginia explained how he became a judge.
An incumbent United States Senator seemed about to retire and Neely,
the grandson of a long-time governor and senator, announced for the seat
and began to raise campaign funds. Neely's support evaporated when the
incumbent filed for reelection. At this point, Neely writes:
I decided it was better to be a winning state supreme court
justice than a losing United States senator, so I took my small
organization and the statewide name recognition I had bought
with the campaign contributions into a lower stakes game
which I could win. I outspent my opponents ten to one and won
the primary election for judge by 35,000 votes and the general
election by 54,000. The outcome had nothing to do with my
legal ability, but with inherited name recognition, the enthusiasm and charm of youth, and money - most of it either mine
53
or my father's.
First, of course, was the political name inherited from his grandfather.
But Neely concludes: "I ...know that when I run for reelection for judge,
I would rather have an impecunious Oliver Wendell Homes as an opponent than a well-financed Jack the Ripper.'

54

In 1988, a candidate who had long been a distinguished state senator
was elected to an open position on the Oregon Supreme Court. After the
election, he was charged with having joined in requesting financial
pledges first at a meeting to organize his campaign and later from business representatives and members of the bar, and with asking for campaign funds from the readers of a labor newspaper.

50Id.
51Id. at 188.
'2JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 174 (1989).
RICHARD NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 35 (1981).
13 RICHARD NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 35 (1981).
4

Id.
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The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the judge's defense that forbidding
candidates to ask for campaign funds was inconsistent with making an
office elective and with the free speech guarantees of the state and federal
constitutions. 55 The court's majority and dissenting opinions sharply fo-

cused the anomaly of election campaigns by candidates who may not ask
people who care about the office to help finance the campaign.
The majority conceded that requests for campaign funds were constitutionally protected free speech: "So long as judges are chosen by the
electoral process, it will be impossible to deny lawyers and potential
litigants the right to give to campaigns or to deny judges the right to
seek contributions. Both activities are too important in the scheme of
things to permit either to be forbidden outright. 56 Candidates for other

offices might be entitled to ask for contributions in person. Nevertheless,
the court held this practice incompatible with judicial office:
A democratic society that, like ours, leaves many of its final
decisions, both constitutional and otherwise, to its judiciary is
totally dependent on the scrupulous integrity of that judiciary.
A judge's direct request for campaign contributions offers a
quid pro quo or, at least, can be perceived by the public to do
so. Insulating the judge from such direct solicitation eliminates
the appearance (at least) of impropriety and, to57that extent,
preserves the judiciary's reputation for integrity.
According to the majority, this justified making judicial candidates
"obtain funds to carry out a campaign [without] the specter of contributions going from the hand of the contributor to the hand of the judge." 8
Forbidding the candidate himself to ask for funds "need not cause the
campaign to suffer, if the judge picks good people for his or her campaign
finance committee" 59-meaning people good at fundraising. If this was
less effective than direct appeals by the candidate, that just proved the
point of the prohibition.
The dissenters saw elections differently. A constitutionally mandated
election implies that candidates will campaign for votes. "Surely, it is
unquestioned," Justice Unis wrote, "that a statute prohibiting candidates
from personally soliciting support for their campaigns could not survive
a constitutional challenge ... ."60 The constitutional right to ask for support for one's candidacy necessarily includes requests for campaign funds,
given the need to reach voters through privately owned media. Personal
solicitation of campaign funds as well as political support cannot be in-

" In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31 (Or. 1990).

56
1 Id.

at 41.

Id.
RId.
59Id.
61In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31 (Or. 1990) (Unis, J., concurring in part, dissenting
57

in part).
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compatible with the role of candidates for elective offices generally, the
dissent argued, and neither Oregon's constitution nor empirical evidence
gave any grounds for singling out judicial candidates.
It is no surprise when a court sustains its own no-solicitation canon in
the name of judicial probity and public respect. The justices were themselves successfully elected with campaign funds raised by "good people";
anyone whose candidacy was unappealing to the good people who help
finance campaigns would likely not be on the court. The court's concerns
about an elected judge's political indebtedness and about the public's
confidence in its judges are understandable. Consider, however, the premises of the decision.
First, the states entrust other elected officials with applying law as
well as a conscientious view of the public interest. State election officers,
state treasurers, attorney generals, and prosecutors are examples. If asking for campaign funds compromises one's ability to act according to one's
best judgment of the public interest, should a court also sustain prohibitions against personal solicitations by candidates for those offices, or
for legislative and gubernatorial candidates?
Second, why draw the line between having others solicit funds for one's
campaign and asking for funds oneself. Judicial candidates may suggest
whom to approach. 61 They are not forbidden to know who contributed and
who did not, nor to thank the donors; indeed, reformers have long insisted
that campaign contributions be publicly reported. 62 As for a judge being
beholden to donors after an election in anticipation of the next election,
other forms of support are more important than any single contribution.
An incumbent judge may need funds to campaign against an opponent
who does not. Washington voters in 1990 replaced incumbent Chief Justice Keith Callow with a lawyer named Charles Johnson, the name of a
television news anchor as well as of a trial judge. It is widely observed
that voters rarely know what appellate judges do, or who the incumbent
is when the ballot does not say.
There is a plausible reason not to let judges personally ask lawyers for
campaign contributions; it is to protect the lawyers' freedom to decline.
But that reason should not overcome a candidate's freedom of speech. The
reason accepted by the Oregon court comes down to appearances: Direct
solicitation of campaign funds is unseemly for judicial though not for
other candidates while indirect requests for funds and direct solicitation
of other forms of support are not unseemly. We do not know whether these
distinctions satisfy the First Amendment because the case was not taken
to the Supreme Court. The fact that many states omit the restraint on
candidates from their versions of Canon 7 suggests that it serves less
than a "compelling" interest if that is the test.

See Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUDI(1976).
See Note, Stuart Banner, DisqualifyingElected Judges from Cases Involving
Campaign Contributions,40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 472 (1988).
61

CATURE 10, 14
62
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RESTORING A DISTINCTIVE JUDICIAL ROLE

Let me end with a recent commentary on law and politics in The New
Yorker magazine. It said that "[t]he battle over the Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork had revealed to the public a grave development
that legal scholars had been observing for some time: a breakdown in
consensus on the most basic American legal principles" about the meaning of the Constitution and about how to apply tools of legal reasoning
to interpret it.63
"One effect of the breakdown," the writer continued, "is that the law
is now almost always spoken of popularly in terms of outcomes that are
indistinguishable from political ends." Judges are assessed in terms of
whether they back or oppose causes like abortion, affirmative action or
the claims of environmentalists and criminal defendants. I interpolate
that state judges, who are responsible for a much wider range of issues,
can add to the list tort plaintiffs, liability insurers, doctors, manufacturers, utility companies, school teachers, school boards, homeowners and
other taxpayers. The piece concluded: "[Liegal thinkers have tried to
rationalize controversial decisions in terms ofjudicial philosophy, but the
failure of their ideas to win public understanding and approval has reinforced the impression that the ends of law and of politics are the same. '6 5
If a new consensus is not reached, "the law will increasingly become what
66
cynical observers contend that it already is -just another tool of power."
The New Yorker has a point. I suspect that people have always judged
court decisions in terms of outcomes rather than premises. No doubt most
people care about results, not reasons. They care about abortion or affirmative action, not about federalism or the Fourteenth Amendment. But
courts give up their defense against the charge that law is nothing more
than politics when they explain their decisions as a choice of social policy
with little effort to attribute that choice to any law.
Styles of explanation are more than pretense. Of course courts, at least
the highest courts, face real choices - otherwise there would be nothing
to appeal - and in some issues, the law makes the predictable effects a
factor in the choice. The search for legal premises is often attacked as
formalism, as heresy against the realist orthodoxy. Yet if a court wants
to maintain its distinction from the legislature, the court must link its
decision to some source besides its own power to choose. If a proposed
opinion cannot articulate a link to some principle beyond the court's
preferred economic or social policy toward the disputed issue, the decision
itself needs a second look. This is true of common law opinions, particularly in Torts, where external legal norms can be hard to find. It is even
more true of constitutional opinions which presuppose that an accountable government has chosen a public policy.

The Talk of the Town, THE NEW

YORKER,

Oct. 28, 1991, at 31.

cmId.
" Id.

6

Id. at 32.
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In this lay the strength of Judge Bork's attack on recent Supreme Court
doctrines. They expressly rested decisions on balancing competing interests, on value judgments whether some interests are more or less fundamental, whether the purpose for bending the First or the Fourteenth
Amendment was compelling or only significant, and whether the means
chosen for the purpose were necessary or only useful. These inescapably
look like legislative judgments, issues on which judges, like legislators,
predictably would divide and on which ordinary citizens would see no
reason to defer to whichever side happened to be in the majority on the
Court. As Professor Robert Nagel has argued, such decisions leave no
reason why opposing sides on an issue like abortion should not demonstrate in front of the Supreme Court building and flood the justices' chambers with mail as Justice Scalia has deplored. 6
When citizens vote to change the court, why should they not do so in
the expectation that the new majority would overrule their predecessors'
policy preferences just as legislators would? Why should judicial candidates not make it clear that this is exactly what they propose to do (or
to resist) if people will muster the financial and other support to elect
them to the court? Why should judges not anticipate the next election
and, like other elected officials, defend their personal votes in media
appearances and mailings to selected audiences whenever an important
decision is rendered? Why should an elected judge not replace a law clerk
with a press aide like those of other elected officials? And why should
advocates not argue that the court should take popular reaction into
account in deciding a controversial issue as they would argue to legislators?
Some audiences would not find this prospect appalling, but I trust you
do. The distinction between courts and other officials, between law and
political discretion, defines the law as a profession. I believe people want
equally impartial performance on their state and federal courts if the
question is put that way. Impartiality and the risk of disqualification are
legitimate grounds for limiting what a judge may say either during or
outside a campaign. Yet, most people also hate to give up the power to
vote judges out of office where this power exists. Reflecting on his own
experience, Justice Grodin called for a public consensus on permissible
criteria in judicial elections, but he acknowledged that people may and
do defeat a judge for any reason without knowing much of what judges
do, from discontentment with one decision or with a general trend. This
leaves an elective judge two choices: to cater to majority opinion, or to
persuade opinion leaders that unpopular rulings are principled applications of law.
What can be done about the contradiction between judicial independence and judicial elections? Not much, I fear, short of giving up on one
or the other. The Canons of Judicial Conduct seek to keep the conduct of

67 Robert F. Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in ConstitutionalCases, 61
U. COLO. L. REv. 685 (1990).
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judicial candidates themselves under control for the sake of appearances
more than for political reality. This does not constrain others who have
political, ideological, or selfish reasons to campaign for or against a judge.
Where bar associations and state courts see restrictions on candidates as
an essential compromise between competing goals, others see a sacrifice
of free speech to hypocrisy. But the conflict can be reduced by steps already
familiar in some states, taken by each branch of government as well as
by citizens who care about the courts.
1. Legislatures can and should finance ways to inform voters about
candidates in all elections as some states now do in official voters pamphlets, but particularly in elections to courts and other professional positions. Legislature should also offer subsidies for campaign media costs
of judicial candidates who limit private campaign funds. The judicial
branch could persistently press these reforms upon legislative and executive branches.
2. Governors should, as a matter of principle, forswear political attacks
on judges (it would help if presidents set the tone) and they should also
advise prosecutors and other executive officials, who collectively are the
largest set of litigants, not to take public sides in judicial campaigns.
3. Other states can develop North Carolina's model of an official but
respected committee on judicial elections into a stronger, long-term body
that can call fouls on improper conduct, even by persons outside the
judicial campaign organizations, so effectively as to make such conduct
counterproductive.
4. More important than any campaign reform, legislature, governors,
and the legal profession should cooperate to find an institutional home
in state government for long-term, systematic law reform and thereby
reduce the demand for courts to serve as the primary lawmakers in major
areas of the law.
5. The courts themselves, instead of relishing that lawmaking role,
can make greater efforts to explain their decisions in a judicial rather
than a legislative style of opinions. Since I am speaking in a law school,
the academy might reconsider its enthusiasm for every innovative opinion
regardless of its juristic cogency.
6. Judges as well as commentators should abandon the facile notion
that legal interpretation by elected judges has either greater legitimacy
or greater latitude than by appointed judges. The distinction undercuts
the courts' claim of professional fidelity to law and effectively invites
those who disagree with an interpretation to campaign against the judges
rather than amend the law.
7. As Judges Reinhardt and Kozinsky said in their Renne concurrence,
if the concern is to free judges from fear that their decisions will cost
them reelection to the court, there are options short of the federal model
of life-time appointment; for instance, to give judges much longer terms
after the first election following an initial trial period.
This list contains nothing about regulation. From my observation, the
quality and self-restraint of election campaigns, including judicial elections, depends far more on a state's political culture, the expectation of
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the people and community leaders, and on the common "consensus of
constraint" mentioned by former Justice Grodin than on laws. Attempts
to restrict the quantity or quality of political campaign speech by prohibitions (beyond those essential to avoid a judge's disqualification in
future cases) 68 contradict the premise of popular elections. Prohibitions
only divert campaigns into less direct channels, and the effort to sustain
them does more harm to principles of free speech than any good that the
restrictions can accomplish.
The federal Constitution postulates adjudication in state courts, and
legitimate adjudication depends on its distinction from ad hoc political
decisions. The federal Constitution also "guarantee[s] to every state . .
' ' 69
a Republican Form of Government. States and state courts must comply
with that obligation, even if the United States Supreme Court will not
adjudicate it.7 If a state's politics cannot distinguish its judges from other
elected officials, the judges' ultimate defense does not lie in trying to
exclude themselves and their constituents from the First Amendment. It
must lie in the Constitution's guarantee of a republican form of government, if a court knows when and how to use it.

" Oregon's formulation, for instance, proscribes political activity by a judge or
judicial candidate that "involves persons, organizations or specific issues that will
require a judge's disqualification under Canon 3(C)." OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(1) (1983) (amended effective Dec. 1, 1983).
69 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
70 See Hans A. Linde, When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican Government", 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159, 160 (1989).
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